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ARTICLE UPDATE
FIFrH UPDATE TO COLORADO WATER LAW: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
THE HONORABLE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
To provide our readers with the most up-to-date water law information, the editors periodically include updates of works previously published in the Water Law Review. The following is the fifth update to
Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, Appendix-Colorado Water
Law: A Synopsis of Statutes and Case Law,' selected by the Honorable
GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr.
Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co. v. Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte River Basin, Inc.
"At the point at which a water rights case ceases to be a dispute
handled informally by a water referee, and becomes litigation involving
pre-trial discovery, sworn live testimony, and expert witnesses, it rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether, at
the trial's conclusion, there is a prevailing party entitled to costs.
Since there is no statute or rule prohibiting the award of costs, and
the unique nature of water right proceedings does not preclude the
applicability of Rule 54(d), the award of costs necessarily rests in the
sound discretion of the water court."
Fort Morgan Reservoir and Irrigation Co.v. Groundwater Appropriators of the South
Platte River Basin, Inc., 85 P.3d 536, 541 (Colo. 2004).

United States of America v. Colorado State Engineer
"The McCarran Amendment does not assert or imply that a state
court would have jurisdiction to review the decision making process of
federal entities, such as Interior or the Park Service, for compliance
with federal law.

1.

Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.

WATER L. REv. 1, 27 (1997). The first update to Justice Hobbs' article appears at 2 U.
DENV. WATER L. REv. 223 (1999); the second update is at 4 U. DENV. WATER L. Rv. 111

(2000); the third update is at 6 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 116 (2002), and the fourth
update is at 8 U. DENV.WATER L. REv. 213 (2004).
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Indeed, such a conclusion would run contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act, the federal statute which establishes the practices
and procedures followed by administrative agencies in rulemaking and
adjudication. The language and legislative history of the APA'sjudicial
review provisions make clear that Congress intended to hold federal
administrative agencies answerable for their conduct only in federal
courts. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (2004). Section 706 provides that a reviewing court shall 'compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.' 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). Section 702 defines the scope
of that review: 'A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute' is entitled to judicial review and may
bring suit against the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 702. However, the suit must
be brought 'in a court of the United States.' Id. Thus, the waiver of
sovereign immunity is expressly limited to federal court. The APA's
legislative history underscores this intent, explicitly stating that the
United States will remain immune from suit in state courts.
The scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity under the McCarran Amendment is not so broad that it allows state courts to evaluate or
adjudicate the federal agency decision making processes leading the
United States to make a particular water application in a given case.
The Environmental Opposers have brought claims in federal court that
can only be decided by that court. Thus, there is no question that
there will be both state and federal proceedings before the United
States' reserved water right for the Black Canyon can be fully resolved.
The federal case will decide whether the United States' amended application complied with the applicable federal law, and the state case
will quantify the reserved water right. We recognize that the federal
case may have an impact on the water court proceeding. Indeed, if the
federal case had no impact on the state case, there would be no need
for a stay. However, the water court will decide the quantification of
the federal reserved right even if the federal court finds that the
agency decision making was flawed and must be redone."
United States v. Colo. State Eng'r, 101 P.3d 1072, 1080 (Colo. 2004) (case citations
omitted).

City of Aurora v. Colorado State Engineer
"Water resulting from reduced consumption by native plants is
commonly referred to as 'salvaged water.' An applicant may not claim
credit for salvaged water in a plan for augmentation. § 37-92-103(9),
C.R.S. (2004). This rule applies to all native vegetation, whether or not
it is classified as phreatophytic. There are two exceptions to this rule
for unlined gravel pits, section 37-92-305(12) (a), C.R.S. (2004), and
on-stream reservoirs, section 37-84-117(5), C.R.S. (2004)."
City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng'r, 105 P.3d 595, 608 (Colo. 2005) (case citations and
footnotes omitted).
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"In Colorado, CRE 702 governs the admission of scientific evidence
and expert testimony. The focus of a CRE 702 inquiry is whether the
proffered scientific evidence is both reliable and relevant. To determine the reliability of scientific evidence under CRE 702, the court's
inquiry should be broad in scope and consider the totality of the circumstances presented in each case. In performing its inquiry, the
court may consider a wide range of factors that are pertinent to the
case at issue. The court should also apply its discretionary authority
under CRE 403 to 'ensure that the probative value of the evidence is
not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.' The court must issue specific findings as it performs its CRE 702 and 403 analyses.
Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. The trial court is vested with this discretion because it has a superior opportunity to determine the competence of the expert. In addition, this deference reflects the superior
opportunity of the trial judge to gauge both the competence of the
expert and the extent to which his opinion would be helpful.
As
such, a trial court's exercise of its discretion will not be overturned
unless manifestly erroneous.
We hold that the water court's exercise of discretion was not manifestly erroneous. The water court properly considered factors pertinent to this case, and issued specific findings regarding the reliability
of the groundwater and surface water models. Specifically, the water
court found that:
'[T]he model itself, is widely used to model aquifer parameters,
among other uses, and... it is capable of producing reliable, relevant
results. However, the court concludes that, in order for computer
modeling results to be reliable, and hence relevant, for predicting the
timing and amount of both depletions and recharge, the model must
be operated in a manner that is consistent with accepted modeling
techniques. If the model is operated in some other manner, there
must be sufficient evidence that such other method produces valid
and reliable results.'
The water court then carefully analyzed the evidence as to the
modeling techniques that PCSR's experts employed to operate the
groundwater and surface water models used in this case. After noting
the relevant techniques, the water court determined PCSR's experts
committed errors in technique with respect to the groundwater model
because they failed to conduct a sensitivity analysis on the model, failed
to properly calibrate the model, failed to explain anomalous results
and residual errors, ignored another expert's report suggesting further
evaluation, and failed to complete an independent peer review of the
model.
The court further determined that PCSR's experts committed errors in technique with respect to the surface water model because
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PCSR failed to adjust calculations for the changing call regime, failed
to factor out irrigation run-off, failed to consider variables other than
precipitation, and failed to determine the range of errors for its simulated stream flows.
Relying on these findings, the water court held that the groundwater model, as operated in this case, failed to produce sufficiently reliable results to permit a reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount, and location of depletions, or the timing and amount of
aquifer recharge. The water court further held that the surface water
model, as operated in this case, failed to produce sufficiently reliable
results to permit a reasonably accurate determination of either average
stream flow or legal availability of augmentation water. Because the
water court's exercise of discretion was not manifestly erroneous, we
refuse to overturn it on appeal."
Id. at 612-13 (case citations and footnotes omitted).

"[T]he water court properly held that PCSR's groundwater and
surface water models failed to produce sufficiently reliable results to
permit a reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount,
and location of stream depletions or the legal availability of replacement water. Additionally, it is clear that PCSR had better access to probative evidence of those elements by virtue of its designing both the
models and the augmentation plan.
Hence, the water court correctly held that, in the absence of sufficient proof, it could not determine the issue of injury with respect to
PCSR's augmentation plan. Accordingly, we conclude that the water
court applied the proper standard of review pursuant to Rule 41 (b) (1)
in dismissing PCSR's augmentation plan."
Id at 616.

East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District v. Rangeview
Metropolitan District
"The anti-speculation doctrine, which was first developed as a limitation on conditional decrees and which mandates a threshold showing
of a proposed non-speculative, beneficial use before the development
of a water project, is not applicable to a judicial determination of available nontributary ground water, as a matter of legislative design. The
protection of potential appropriators is unnecessary in this context
because, by statute, there can be none, see § 37-90-102(2); protection
against waste at this stage is unnecessary because, by statute, a structure
to withdraw nontributary ground water may not be constructed without
satisfying the state engineer of a non-speculative, beneficial use to
which the water will be put, see § 37-90-137(4); and perhaps most importantly, to require a showing of non-speculative, beneficial use at an
adjudication proceeding would thwart a clearly expressed legislative
intent to permit adjudication for future uses without a corresponding
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obligation to develop them. See § 37-90-137(6); § 37-92-305(11). Although, to be sure, adjudication results in a vested right, the legislature
has nevertheless reserved the authority to modify such a right if necessary to prevent waste, promote beneficial use, or require reasonable
conservation. § 37-92-305(11)."
East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation Dist. v. Rangeview Metro. Dist., 109
P.3d 154, 158 (Colo. 2005).

"In sharp contrast to nontributary ground water, designated
ground water is regulated by the state ground water commission. See
§§ 37-90-104 to -108. Although designated ground water in the Denver
Basin aquifers is allocated on the basis of overlying land ownership, in
the manner of nontributary ground water rather than other designated
ground water, the commission has the dual responsibility of determining availability and issuing permits for its withdrawal.
§ 37-90107(7) (a) and (8). While a conditional well permit is still a prerequisite to withdrawing and using the water, see § 37-90-107(7)(d), and
application for a well permit requires a showing of beneficial use, id.,
the statutory scheme for designated ground water does not evince any
intent to permit adjudication of a use right without plans for development and use of the resource.
Unlike nontributary ground water, the statutes governing Denver
Basin designated ground water not only fail to place the authority for
determining availability and issuing well permits in different bodies;
they also fail to sanction the 'adjudication' of vested rights for 'future'
uses or to excuse showings or findings of reasonable diligence following a determination of availability. In the absence of any clear expression of legislative intent to permit the adjudication of a vested right to
an amount of underlying Denver Basin designated ground water, separate and distinct from obtaining a conditional permit and diligently
constructing a well to extract and apply the water to a beneficial use,
we found a threshold showing of a non-speculative, beneficial use to be
required, prior even to a determination of availability by the commission, in order to prevent waste and promote beneficial use. The same
concerns do not arise in the general assembly's significantly different
treatment of nontributary ground water."
Id. at 158-59.

"As the water court in the current proceeding expressly recognized,
judgments and decrees entered prior to July 1, 1985 with respect to
nontributary ground water must be given full effect and enforced according to their terms. See § 37-92-203(1). Such prior decrees were
not nullified or superseded by subsequent statutory changes, but at the
same time, an overlying landowner is in no way barred from an adjudication of the full amount of nontributary ground water to which he is
statutorily entitled, merely because he had already been decreed the
use of a portion of that amount. While the statutory provisions creat-
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ing an inchoate right in overlying landowners preserve the pre-existing
vested use rights of others, see § 37-90-137(2) and (4), the scheme
cannot be reasonably understood to reduce the underlying nontributary ground water available to a landowner as a result of his own prior
decree."
Id. at 159.

Colorado Water Conservation Board v. Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District
".... SB 216, in its final form, limits the entities that can claim RICD
[Recreational In-Channel Diversion] water rights, and specifically delineates the role of the CWCB [Colorado Water Conservation Board],
only authorizing it to conduct fact-finding with respect to specific factors and to make a recommendation. Yet, the final version does not
give the CWCB the extensive oversight and adjudicatory authority it
sought, nor does it give the CWCB any authority to dictate a flow rate
or recreation experience for RICD water rights.
While constrained, the CWCB's role under SB 216 is not unimportant. Reviewing a RICD application under the five statutory factors no
doubt requires the Board to undertake a careful, probing analysis. For
example, section 37-92-102(6) (b) (I) directs the CWCB to find whether
the adjudication and administration of the sought RICD 'would impair
the ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to consumptive beneficial use its compact entitlements.' Thus, whether a RICD shields waters from a consumptive use that would otherwise be available under a
particular compact is a factor for the CWCB to consider in reaching its
recommendation. This duty is consistent with the CWCB's enabling
statute which in turn, directs the Board to pay particular attention to
development of Colorado's interstate water apportionments. See § 3760-106(1) (h), (i), C.R.S. (2004).
In addition, section 37-92-102(6) (b) (V) directs the CWCB to find
whether adjudication and administration of the RICD application
'would promote maximum utilization of waters of the state' as envisioned by section 37-92-102(1) (a) which incorporates a basic tenet of
Colorado water law into RICD applications. Again, this duty is consistent with the Board's enabling statute, under which the CWCB has the
duty 'to promote the conservation of the waters of the state of Colorado in order to secure the greatest utilization of such waters.' § 37-60106(1). To this end, the CWCB is to promote the implementation of
'sound measures to enhance water use efficiency in order to serve all
the water needs of the state.' § 37-60-106(1) (r).
If in considering an applicant's claimed stream flows for compliance
with the five statutory factors, the CWCB determined, for example, that
the RICD would impair the availability of upstream consumptive uses
of compact-entitled water, or that the RICD would not conserve or effi-
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ciently use the claimed water, thereby promoting maximum utilization
of Colorado's available water, then the Board could recommend to the
water court that the application be denied. An applicant does not have
an entitlement to a 'grant' recommendation from the CWCB merely
upon a showing of water availability. Rather, the Board has the authority to recommend denial where an application strictly as submitted by
the applicant does not comport with the five statutory factors in section
37-92-102 (6) (b).
In the case before us, the CWCB has not made findings on whether
beneficial consumptive water use opportunities upstream from the
claimed RICD would further develop Colorado's compact entitlements
and would be impaired by Applicant's sought for stream flow amounts.
Moreover, no findings were made on whether Applicant's claimed
stream flows would conserve and efficiently use the available Gunnison
River flow, thereby promoting maximum utilization of Colorado's waters. Since the CWCB has not made all of the findings required by
these and the other statutory factors codified at section 37-92102(6) (b) (I) -(V), the water court lacks information that the General
Assembly considered material to the water court's ultimate determination regarding the amounts of water to which the RICD decree must be
restricted."
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109
P.3d 585, 595 (Colo. 2005).

"Putting the ... legislative history together with the language of the
statute, we hold that the phrases 'minimum stream flow' 'for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water' should be interpreted
in the following manner. Initially, the water court must determine
whether an application is for a RICD as defined in section 37-92103(10.3). To do so, the water court first must determine whether the
appropriation sought by the applicant, viewed objectively, is for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water - more specifically,
are the requested flow amounts reasonable on the particular stream?
This determination necessarily will vary from application to application, depending on the stream involved and the availability of water
within the basin. Once the water court has determined whether a
RICD application is for an objectively reasonable recreation experience in and on the stream in question, then it must determine the
minimum amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience. Hence, the water court may be required to weigh conflicting expert testimony given by course designers
or other interested parties, and make a finding as to the least necessary
stream flow to achieve an applicant's objectively reasonable recreation
experience.
In any event, it is clear from the plain language of the statutory
definition of a RICD, as well as SB 216's legislative history, that the water court may not take the appropriator's suggestion, as set forth in the
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application, of what a reasonable recreation experience is for the
stream involved at face value, nor should the water court accept without scrutiny the applicant's analysis of what stream flow is necessary to
achieve that objective.
Finally, in making the above determinations, the water court must
carefully evaluate the factors set forth in section 37-92-102(6) (b), giving presumptive effect to unrebutted CWCB findings, and also considering the Board's recommendation and any other evidence submitted
in the course of the trial. An applicant is not entitled to a decreed
RICD merely upon a showing of water availability. The water court
only may decree a RICD that is appropriate under the five statutory
factors - compact impairment, stream reach appropriateness, access
availability, instream flow rights injury, and maximum utilization."
Id. at 602-03.

East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer and Weld Irrigation Co.
"East Ridge does not hold any shares in the Irrigation Company.
East Ridge is also not the decreed owner of a water right that has been
adjudicated in water court. To the contrary, the water that East Ridge
has been using is, in fact, decreed to the Irrigation Company, and East
Ridge's predecessor's dates of appropriation were used in obtaining
that decree.
Where the water consumer is neither an appropriator nor a shareholder, he may nonetheless have contractual rights to make use of water. However, the instrument granting rights of use becomes the dispositive instrument rather than the statutes."
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer and Weld Irrigation Co., 109 P.3d 969, 973

(Colo. 2005) (case citations omitted).
"We conclude that East Ridge's rights must be determined by the
terms of the water contracts through and on which the claims for water
are based. East Ridge has a right to use water as provided in the water
contracts, and these rights are governed by the contract and not by
section 37-92-305(3).
The language of the Contracts is ambiguous, but an examination of
extrinsic evidence leads us to believe that the parties intended to restrict the delivery of water to irrigation on property owned by Plummer
and McGinley at the time.
Accordingly, we affirm the Water Court's decision that the rights
may not be changed from the location or use to which the contract
assigns them."
Id.at 976.
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Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden
"Appellants contend the water court's cost award to Golden is erroneous and contest three aspects of the costs award. First, they argue
that they, and not Golden, are the prevailing parties under C.R.C.P.
54(d). Second, Appellants argue that, even if Golden is the prevailing
party, Golden presented insufficient evidence to establish costs. Third,
the municipal appellants, the cities of Westminster, Thornton, Northglenn and Arvada, argue that neither Rule 54(d) nor section 13-51-114
authorize courts to enter cost awards against the State or its political
subdivisions. We conclude the water court's finding that Golden was
the prevailing party is supported by the record. Golden also presented
sufficient evidence regarding costs to support the amount of the award.
We agree with the municipal appellants, however, that the award of
costs against them were not permitted by law."
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119, 127 (Colo. 2005).

Ready Mixed Concrete Company in Adams County v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company
"By the close of the Nineteenth Century, agricultural ditches interlaced the South Platte Basin along Colorado's Front Range and downstream to Nebraska. Constructed independently of each other and
operating with differing priorities, downstream ditches often depended for a portion or all of their supply upon return flow water percolating into groundwater from ditch seepage and field irrigation or
returning overland to the river via drainage ditches or 'wasteways.'
Ready Mixed Concrete Co. v. Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co., 115 P.3d 638, 64243 (Colo. 2005) (footnotes omitted).

"Taking all of the decree provisions together, we must construe
them contrary to the developed water theory Ready Mixed Concrete
argues. The referee's report and the decree are explicit that the decreed use of the McCanne Ditch water is for irrigation of 300 acres of
land, not to exceed 900 acre-feet per year. It appears that the referee
found that loss of water back to the stream from conveyance and irrigation through porous soil near the river was so great as to warrant the
application of three acre-feet of water to every acre of land to grow a
crop, and included the 900 acre-foot volumetric limitation as a condition to prohibit wasteful irrigation of the 300 acres. This 900 acre-foot
condition was not intended to be a volumetric water consumption allowance."
I& at 644.

"'[O]ur cases hold that water 'salvaged' by reducing evaporation or
cutting vegetation cannot result in a decree free of the river's call for a
new or changed appropriation. To permit such a practice would en-
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courage stripping the environment . . .Accordingly, our decisions in

R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Assn. of Dist. No. 6 and Giffen v. State of
Colorado prevent water rights priorities from being created or
enlarged free of the call of other water rights, by draining wetlands,
marshes, and seeps, or by paving lands. In the name of reducing
evaporation or transpiration, such 'developed water' schemes seek to
establish super priorities in the river system."
Id. at 644 (case citations omitted).

High Plains A & M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy
District
"A change of water right decree recognizes that the priority of the
existing right can be operated for new uses at different locations under
conditions necessary to maintain the appropriation without injury to
other decreed appropriations. Our seminal change of water rights
decision, Strickler, involved a city's purchase of agricultural water
rights for change to municipal uses. In that case, we established the
following points of Colorado water law applicable to changes of water
rights: (1) the water resource is the property of the public; (2) the priority of a use right obtained by irrigating a particular parcel of land is a
property right that can be separated from the land; (3) the owner of
the use right may sell it to another person or governmental entity; and
(4) the courts may decree a change in the point of diversion, type,
time, and/or place of beneficial use, subject to no injury of other water
rights.
In 1919, the General Assembly required adjudication of all water
rights in order to establish their priorities and enforce them. Act of
Apr. 9, ch. 147, sec. 2, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 487, 488-89. From the
water right owner's standpoint, the reason for adjudicating the right is
to realize the value and expectations secured through administration
of that right's priority; if not adjudicated, the priority will not be enforced. An express feature of the water law is maximization of as many
decreed uses as possible within Colorado's allocation of interstateapportioned waters."
High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., 120 P.3d 710, 718 (Colo.
2005) (case citations omitted).

"The subject of a change decree proceeding is a conditional or an
absolute water right. As shown by Strickler and our subsequent change
cases, the status of the appropriation and the appropriator are subject
to identification, examination, and verification in the change proceeding. Priority of appropriation for beneficial use is the foundation upon
which the exercise of decreed water rights in their original or changed
form depends in Colorado. Under the statutes and the case law, the
appropriator or the appropriator's agent appears for the purpose of
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demonstrating the actual historical beneficial use of an absolute water
right and the appropriation's new actual beneficial uses.
Section 37-92-103(3) (a) (I) and (II) apply in a change in type and
place of use proceeding because the absolute decree for a water right is
reopened by virtue of a change application, and the contemplated result is operation of the absolute appropriation under changed conditions pursuant to a new decree. § 37-92-103(3) (a) (II), C.R.S. (2005).
Accordingly, the change applicant must show a legally vested interest
in the land to be served by the change of use and a specific plan and
intent to use the water for specific purposes. This statutory requirement can be satisfied by a showing that the appropriator of record for
purposes of the change decree is a governmental agency, or a person
who will use the changed water right for his or her own lands or business or has an agreement to provide water to a public entity and/or
private lands or businesses to be served by the changed water right. §
37-92-103(3) (a) (I), C.R.S. (2005)."
Id. at 720 (case citations omitted).

"As our cases repeatedly demonstrate, each water right has a situs
identified by the point of the diversion and the place to which the water is delivered for actual beneficial use. A water right requires both an
appropriator and a place where the appropriation is put to actual
beneficial use. Accordingly, a change decree recognizes a new situs for
the appropriation. In defining '[c]hange of water right' to include 'a
change in the type, place, or time of use' and 'a change in the point of
diversion,' section 37-92-103(5), C.R.S. (2005), and in defining 'appropriation' in section 37-92-103(3) (a)(I) and (1I), the 1969 Act anticipates, as a basic predicate of an application for a decree changing
the place of use, that there is a sufficiently described actual beneficial
use to be made at an identified location or locations under the change
decree."
Id. at 720-21 (footnotes omitted).

ISG, LLC v. Arkansas Valley Ditch Association
"In addition to permanent changes of water rights, state water law
now allows for a variety of means by which the type or place of use decreed to a water appropriator may be changed temporarily. See. e.g., §
37-80.5-104 to -106, C.R.S. (2005) (allowing for creation of water banking programs for leasing, loaning, and exchanging stored water rights
when approved by the state engineer); § 37-83-104, C.R.S.
(2005) (providing for exchange of water between streams or between
reservoirs and ditches when approved by the state engineer); § 37-83105, C.R.S. (2005) (allowing decreed agricultural users to loan all or a
portion of their water right to another agricultural user in the same
stream system for up to 180 days in a year when approved by the division engineer); § 37-92-309, C.R.S. (2005) (providing for temporary
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interruptible water supply agreements between decreed owners and
loaning use of water for up to three out of ten years when approved by
the state engineer)."
ISG, LLC v. Arkansas Valley Ditch Ass'n, 120 P.3d 724, 732 (Colo. 2005).

"Nothing in our decisions in High Plains or this case prevents ISG
shareholders from proceeding under statutes that provide for a variety
of means by which changes can be made on a temporary basis with
approval by the state or division engineer. See, e.g., §§ 37-80.5-104 to 106, 37-83-104, 37-83-105, 37-92-309, C.R.S. (2005).
The statutorily authorized temporary changes of use proceed
through the state or division engineer, and the water court reviews on
appeal questions of injury; the court may review the applicant's initial
estimate of the historic consumptive use of water and the state or division engineer's determination that no injury to other users will result.
See, e.g., § 37-80.5-104.5(1) (c), C.R.S. (2005) (for deposit into stored
water bank, state engineer requires proof of 'legal parameters of the
water for use' and must administer any water withdrawn from a bank
'[w]ithout causing material injury to the owner of or persons entitled
to use water under a vested water right'); § 37-83-105(2) (b), C.R.S.
(2005) (for temporary agricultural loan, applicant must submit 'reasonable estimate of the historic consumptive use of the loaned water
right' and division engineer must ensure that no injury will result from
the loan); § 37-92-309(3) (a) & (b), C.R.S. (2005) (applicant for interruptible water supply agreement must submit report evaluating 'the
historical consumptive use, return flows, and the potential for material
injury to other water rights;' and state engineer approval is dependent
on a determination that the agreement 'will effect only a temporary
change in the historic consumptive use of the water right in a manner
that will not cause injury to other water rights').
Each of the temporary changes requires particular evidence to be
presented to the state or division engineer regarding the timing, duration, purpose, and volumetric measure of the temporary change to be
made and approved.
See, e.g., § 37-80.5-104.5(1)(c), C.R.S.
(2005) (deposit into and withdrawal from stored water banks requires a
definition of the quantities of water involved and the proposed uses); §
37-83-104, C.RS. (2005) (requiring those exchanging reservoir and
ditch rights to build measurement devices so the engineer 'may readily
determine and secure the just and equitable exchange of water'); § 3783-105(2) (b) (I), C.R.S. (2005) (requiring applicant for temporary agricultural loan to supply proof of, among other things, decreed water
right, duration of plan, description of diversions, return flow patterns,
and a reasonable estimate of historic consumptive use); § 37-92309(3) (a), (4) (a), C.R.S. (2005) (requiring applicant for interruptible
water supply agreement to submit written report estimating historical
consumptive use, return flows, potential for injury; state engineer pro-
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vides copies of approval or denial to all parties and the decision can be
reviewed by the water court).
By enacting these statutes, the General Assembly has authorized
short-term changes that do not penalize the appropriator in any subsequent change of water right proceeding. The methodology for calculating historic consumptive use of the water rights over a representative
period of time for a permanent change will not count or discount the
years of authorized temporary use. See An Act Concerning Conditions
under which the Owner of a Water Right can Overcome a Presumption
of Abandonment of the Water Right, S.B. 05-133, 65th Gen. Assem., 1st
Sess. (Colo. 2005) (§ 37-92-103(2), providing that temporary nonuse of
water under state conservation programs, municipal conservation programs, approved land fallowing programs, or water banks does not
indicate an intent to discontinue permanent use).
ISG's argument that it will suffer an 'historic consumptive use penalty' by taking advantage of statutory temporary changes to its water
rights without a change decree is not correct. Unlike the applicant for
a permanent change of water rights in Santa Fe Trail Ranches, any authorized temporary changes to type or place of use made by ISG will
not serve to reduce its historic consumptive use allocation as measured
by operation of the FLCC decreed water rights. Nor will those changes
give rise to a presumption of discontinuance or abandonment. The
legislature clearly intended to promote flexibility in the administration
of water rights, especially in the circumstances of temporarily transferring water from agricultural use to municipal use on a contract basis.
It did not intend to penalize owners of decreed appropriations for
properly taking advantage of these statutes according to their terms."
Id. at 733-34 (case citations and footnotes omitted).

Tatum v. People ex rel. Simpson
"Section 37-84-112(1) requires the owner of an irrigation ditch to
install and maintain at the point of intake a suitable and proper
headgate to control the water at all ordinary stages. The statute provides in relevant part:
The owners of any irrigation ditch ... taking water from any stream,

shall erect where necessary and maintain in good repair, at the point of
intake of such ditch ..., a suitable and proper headgate of height and

strength and with embankments sufficient to control the water at all
ordinary stages ....

§ 37-84-112(1). The statute also requires an owner to install and
maintain a suitable and proper measuring flume and wastegate in connection with the ditch. Id.
A headgate must be sufficient to control the waters entering a
ditch. It is the duty of every person taking water from an irrigation
ditch, upon finding that he is receiving more water from the ditch
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through his headgate or any other means whatsoever, to take immediate steps to prevent more water from entering the ditch than that to
which he is entitled." See § 37-84-125, C.R.S. (2005).
Tatum v. People ex reL Simpson, 122 P.3d 997, 998 (Colo. 2005) (case citations omitted).

"The record clearly indicates that although a headgate was present
at the point of diversion, it nonetheless failed to serve its function to
control the inflow of water at all ordinary stages. Given this evidence,
the record amply supports the water court's conclusion that Tatum was
in violation of section 37-84-112(1)."
Id. at 999.

Colorado Water Conservation Board v. City of Central
"We conclude the legislature instead envisioned the primary value
of an instream flow right to derive from a basic tenet of water law: its
ability to preserve the stream conditions existing at the time of its appropriation. To effectuate this goal, this court has rejected the argument that subsequent junior appropriators may adjudicate rights superior to those instream flow water rights decreed to the Board.
In rejecting this contention, we emphasized that the purpose of the legislation was to ensure that streams could not be dried up by subsequent
upstream appropriators:
"The legislative intent is quite clear that these appropriations are to
protect and preserve the natural habitat and the decrees confirming
them award priorities [that] are superior to the rights of those who
may later appropriate. Otherwise, upstream appropriations could later
be made, the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation destroyed."
In short, although a junior instream flow cannot preserve minimum streamflows by taking water from existing uses, it can protect flow
from subsequent appropriators: an instream flow may protect flow remaining in the stream after decreed senior rights are satisfied.
We now further conclude that, to effectuate the General Assembly's purpose of preserving the environment through minimum
streamflows, the Board is entitled to necessary protective terms and
conditions in a decree approving an augmentation plan. Water right
proceedings are typically concerned with either appropriating a new
water right or adapting an existing water right to a new use. Yet many
Colorado basins are fully appropriated or overappropriated and it is
infeasible to obtain a reliable supply of water based on new appropriations. As a result, the majority of water right adjudications - and,
therefore, the biggest threat to maintaining minimum flows - involve
adapting old water rights to new water requirements through changes
and plans for augmentation, including exchanges. Absent an ability to
assert injury against a senior water right adapting to a new or enlarged

Issue 2

ARTICLE UPDATE

use, instream flows could be eliminated by a change of water right or
plan for augmentation.
It has long been the rule that a senior water right adapting to a new
or enlarged use through a change of water right proceeding may do so
only if it does not injure senior or junior users. This noninjury requirement derives from the longstanding tenet of water law that ajunior appropriator is entitled to expect that stream conditions existing at
the time of appropriation will be maintained. Under the noninjury
rule, an application for a change of water right is always subject to the
limitation that such change not injure the rights of junior appropriators: 'ajunior appropriator may successfully resist all proposed changes
in points of diversion and use of water from that source which in any
way materially injures or adversely affects their rights.' As a result, the
right to change a water right is limited in quantity by historical use at
the original decreed point of diversion. 'Historical use' as a limitation
on the right to change a water right applies the principle that junior
appropriators have vested rights in the continuation of stream conditions as they existed at the time of their respective appropriations.
Subsections 37-92-305(3) and (4) codify this noninjury standard for a
change of water right: '[b]efore the water court may grant an application for a change of water rights, the applicant must demonstrate that
the proposed change will not injuriously affect the vested rights of
other water users.'
Thus, a junior instream flow right may resist all proposed changes
in time, place, or use of water from a source which in any way materially injures or adversely affects the decreed minimum flow in the absence of adequate protective conditions in the change of water right or
augmentation decree.
We hold the noninjury requirement applicable to changes of water
rights also applies to augmentation plans affecting instream flow rights.
We likewise hold that an adjudicated instream flow right entitles its
holder to maintain the stream conditions existing at the time of its appropriation and to resist proposed developments through changes of
water rights or augmentation plans, regardless of the means, that in
any way materially injure instream flow rights.
This rule best effectuates the clear legislative intent to protect and
preserve the natural habitat through minimum streamflows. In the
absence of this rule, senior diverters could simultaneously increase the
supply of water yet divert around or from an existing instream flow
right by a water project exchange or other means. Were this permitted, the prohibited result we noted in Colorado River Water Conservation District would occur: upstream adaptations could later be made,
the streams dried up, and the whole purpose of the legislation destroyed. This, the legislature did not intend. To the contrary, the
General Assembly identified instream flows as the mechanism to effect
a basic tenet of Colorado water law: 'to correlate the activities of man-
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kind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment.' §
37-92-102 (3), C.R.S. (2005)."
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. City of Central, 125 P.3d 424, 439-40 (Colo. 2005)
(case and article citations omitted).

Public Service Company of Colorado v. Meadow Island Ditch Company No. 2
"Colorado law distinguishes between an adjudicated water right
and a contractual entitlement to make use of water. The value of an
adjudicated water right is such that, absent consent, only the owner of
the decreed water right may change it. In this regard, we have emphasized that '[a] contrary view would severely undermine the rights and
obligations acquired by persons granted decrees as the result of water
adjudication proceedings.'
In contrast, the rights represented by contract are not water rights
with a statutory right to change the use. Indeed, the authority to obtain water rights under contract 'does not include the ability to obtain
a change in a water right owned by another person or entity absent a
Instead, '[a]
grant of such authority . .. by such person or entity.'
contract user is, in effect, a consumer whose rights are determined by
the terms of that contract.'
Thus, contractually-delivered water rights are 'far different' than a
water right acquired by original appropriation, diversion, and application to beneficial use. Hence, we interpret contractual grants to use a
decreed water right narrowly to avoid depriving a decreed rights
holder of property that it did not specifically grant for use."
Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Meadow Island Ditch Co. No. 2, 132 P.3d 333, 340-41
(2006).

"Accordingly, we decline to interpret the Agreements' silence as a
bargain for a change of use of water right, one of the most important
sticks in the bundle constituting a water right. A contrary conclusion
'would severely undermine the rights and obligations acquired [under
Meadow Island's decrees] as a result of water adjudication proceedings.' Allowing a change of use for the excess water without the consent of Meadow Island would enlarge PSCo's consumer benefits beyond those for which it contracted, and 'would require the court to
make a new and different contract for the parties, which it cannot do."'
Id. at 342 (case citations omitted).

Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson

"Upon non-compliance with an order mandating partial or total
discontinuance of any diversion, see § 37-92-502(1), (2), C.R.S. (2005),
section 37-92-503, C.R.S. (2005), imposes a duty on the state and division engineers to apply for an injunction enjoining the person to
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whom the order was directed from further violations, and it makes
clear an intent that contempt sanctions punish any violation of such an
injunction. § 37-92-503(1),(4). In addition, subsection (6) mandates
civil penalties for a range of conduct involving ground water and well
operation. In particular, subsection (6) (a) provides that:
'Any person who diverts ground water contrary to a valid order of the
state engineer or division engineer issued pursuant to section 37-92502, in violation of a plan approved pursuant to rules and regulations
adopted by the state engineer, or otherwise in violation of rules and
regulations adopted by the state engineer to regulate or measure diversions of ground water shall forfeit and pay a sum not to exceed five
hundred dollars for each day such violation continues.'"
Vaughn v. People ex rel. Simpson, 135 P.3d 721, 723 (Colo. 2006).
"In particular, the court heard evidence that Vaughn had authorized family members to irrigate and grow an alfalfa crop in previous
years, up to and including 2002, and that the well was decreed and
used for that purpose. Despite the engineer's order, the same fields
produced another alfalfa crop in the 2003 season, with which Vaughn
personally assisted. In addition, the more than six million gallons of
water diverted through the well could not have been removed by fewer
than 1100 trips of a tanker truck and would have filled the nearby detention pond to overflowing about 18 times, no signs of which were
noticed by the water commissioner.
These circumstances, in conjunction with the court's determination based on independent evidence that Vaughn had actual knowledge of both the order and the continued use of his well, easily supported the court's inference that Vaughn knew what was being done
with his water and yet did nothing to stop it. Unless the court believed
Vaughn's unsubstantiated testimony of ignorance and his suggestion of
intruders, which the court openly rejected as incredible, virtually the
only logical inference to be drawn from the circumstantial evidence
before it was that Vaughn's well continued to be used for the irrigation
of his fields, with either his authorization or his actual participation, or
both.
Because a ground water rights owner or user whose well is pumped
with his authorization is a "person who diverts ground water" within
the meaning of section 37-92-503(6) (a), and because the People presented sufficient evidence to support the water court's finding that
Vaughn diverted ground water contrary to the division engineer's order, the judgment of the water court is affirmed."
Id. at 725.
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Harmony Ditch Company v. Ground Water Management Subdistrict of
the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District
"[T]he water court entered a decree approving the plan for augmentation, which provides, in pertinent part: 'Pursuant to § 37-92305(8), C.R.S., the State Engineer shall curtail all out-of-priority diversions, the depletions from which are not so replaced as to prevent injury to vested water rights.'
The mandate of section 37-92-305(8) - that decrees approving
plans for augmentation impose a duty of curtailment, under certain
circumstances, on the state engineer - is entirely a creature of statute,
and the statute itself specifies what the decree must demand of the
state engineer. By imposing a duty of curtailment on the state engineer in terms of the precise formula required by statute, the water
court has complied with the mandate of the statute. Should a party
suffer injury as a result of the state engineer's attempt to comply with
his obligation, avenues exist to challenge the scope of his authority, as
intended by the legislature and decreed by the water court, in the context of the particular circumstances."
Harmony Ditch Co. v. Ground Water Mgmt. Subdist. of the Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 136 P.3d 899, 901-2 (Colo. 2006).

McNichols v. Elk Dance Colorado
"The doctrine of issue preclusion provides that a court's final decision on an issue actually litigated and decided in a previous suit is conclusive of that issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties or
their privies, and may not be relitigated. Issue preclusion is an equitable doctrine intended to 'relieve parties of multiple lawsuits, conserve
judicial resources, and promote reliance on the judicial system by preIn Colorado, the doctrine of issue
venting inconsistent decisions.'
preclusion bars relitigation of an issue when:
(1) The issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and
necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding;
(2) The party against whom estoppel was sought was a party to or was
in privity with a party to the prior proceeding;
(3) There was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding;
and
(4) The party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding.
McNichols v. Elk Dance Colo., 139 P.3d 660, 667 (Colo. 2006) (case citations omitted).
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"In the present case, Appellants did not challenge the jurisdiction of
the Summit County District Court at trial or on direct appeal of the
Summit County Judgment. Instead, Appellants seek to defeat the doctrine of issue preclusion and re-litigate the issue of ownership of the
disputed water rights in an entirely new and only tangentially related
proceeding, by arguing that the Summit County Judgment is void for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. If Appellants could collaterally attack the jurisdiction of the Summit County District Court at any time,
even years after that court's final decision, it would undermine the finality of the judgment and could lead to conflicting factual determinations on the issue of ownership of the disputed water. Therefore, as in
O'Neill, we hold that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars Appellants
from re-litigating the subject matter jurisdiction of the Summit County
District Court."
Id at 671.

Natural Energy Resources Company v. Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District
"The purpose of the 'can and will' statute is to subject conditional
rights 'to continued scrutiny to prevent the hoarding of priorities to
the detriment of those seeking to apply the state's water beneficially.'
The General Assembly intended 'to reduce speculation associated with
conditional decrees and to increase the certainty of the administration
of water rights in Colorado.' Accordingly, the 'substantial probability'
standard is employed to curb indefinite speculation, not to protect a
conditional water right where only the thinnest possibility remains that
the project can and will be completed."
Natural Energy Res. Co. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 142 P.3d
1265, 1277 (Colo. 2006).

"Here, the courts have examined the relevant facts and circumstances and determined that it is 'not reasonable to expect that the
Applicant can ever obtain consent of the United States to so materially
alter the use of the Taylor Park Reservoir,' that NECO's proposed use
of the Taylor Park Reservoir 'would disrupt decreed rights and would
require a major operational change of the reservoir,' and that such use
is altogether 'inimical' to its present use. Implicit within these findings
is the determination that there are no 'other facts and circumstances'
which show NECO's diligence in effectuating the conditional Decree."
Id. at 1278.

"Throughout all of the litigation concerning the Decree, NECO
and NECO's predecessor in interest, Arapahoe, have had an interest in
demonstrating the feasibility of the Union Park Project in order to satisfy the 'can and will' requirement underlying the conditional water
right awarded in the 1982 Decree. The feasibility of the project de-
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pended, in part, upon the proposed use of Taylor Park Reservoir as a
forebay and afterbay and the installation and use of a pumping station
at Taylor Park Reservoir. It is plain from the history of the case that
NECO has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the feasibility of
the proposed Union Park Project and by inclusion, the feasibility of the
proposals related to Taylor Park Reservoir."
Id at 1282-83.

Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Commission (No. 05SA253, November 6, 2006)
"[W]e have previously noted that designated ground water 'includes water not tributary to any stream, and other water not available
for the fulfillment of decreed surface rights.' We have also observed
that designated ground water falls into a category of ground water not
part of the natural stream, and any use of this water has a 'de minimus
[sic] effect on any surface stream.' These statements stand for the rule
that designated ground water cannot, as a matter of law, impact surface
flows by greater than a de minimis amount.
Furthermore, the Management Act defines "designated ground water basin" as "that area established by the ground water commission in
accordance with section 37-90-106," the definition of designated
ground water. § 37-90-103(7). Reading these definitions and our prior
case law together leads to the conclusion that all ground water contained within the geographic boundaries of a designated basin is to be
considered designated ground water - i.e., ground water that has no
more than a de minimis impact on any surface stream."
"Section 37-90-106(1) (a) of the Management Act states that the
Commission 'shall, from time to time as adequate factual data becomes
available, determine designated ground water basins and subdivisions
thereof by geographic description and, as future conditions require
and factual data justify, shall alter the boundaries or description
thereof.' § 37-90-106(1) (a) (emphasis added). Notably, this provision
was originally part of the Management Act. § 148-18-5, 9 C.R.S. (1963
& Perm. Cum. Supp. 1965). As this provision makes clear, the General
Assembly anticipated that a designated ground water basin could include ground water that does not properly fall within the definition of
designated ground water. When future conditions and factual data
reveal this to be the case, the Management Act requires that the Commission redraw the boundaries of the designated basin. § 37-90106(1) (a) ('shall alter the boundaries or description thereof") (emphasis added).
Based upon section 37-90-106(1) (a), we hold that the Commission
has jurisdiction over surface water rights to the extent that a holder of
those rights seeks changes to a designated basin's boundaries. The
surface right holder, in order to receive relief, must prove that the
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pumping of then-designated ground water has more than a de minimis
impact on their surface water rights and is causing injury to those
rights. Upon such a showing, the Management Act requires the Commission redraw the boundaries of the designated basin to exclude the
surface water rights and those wells pumping designated ground water
that has been proven to fall more properly within the definition of
ground water subject to the 1969 Act. After the boundaries are redrawn, the State Engineer and the water courts regain jurisdiction and
can administer the relative water rights under the 1969 Act. Of course,
when an appropriator initiates a proceeding before the Commission
claiming ground water has been improperly designated and seeking
changes to the boundaries of the basin, the procedural requirements
of section 37-90-106 must be followed."
"[A] surface water right holder, such as the Gallegos Family, claiming injury caused by pumping within a designated ground water basin
has the burden of proving that the ground water being pumped is hydrologically connected and causing injury to the surface water rights at
issue. This is but another way of saying that the surface water right
holder must prove the ground water alleged to cause injury is not designated ground water."
Gallegos v. Colo. Ground Water Dist., 147 P.3d 20, 28-9 (Colo. 2006).

Central Colorado Water Conservancy District v. City of Greeley
(Nos. 05SA120 and 05SA121, November 6, 2006)
"We agree with the water court's determination that the 1882 Decree was for an absolute water right. The water court based its determination on Mr. Jones's testimony that he irrigated all of his land that
needed irrigation. Nothing in either the language of the 1882 Decree
or Mr. Jones's testimony suggests that he intended to include a condition for irrigating additional acres in the future. The nature of Mr.
Jones's request confirms that the 1882 Decree was for an absolute appropriation that created a vested property right that 'entitles the subsequent operation of that right through its decreed point of diversion
in a specified amount.'
Having established that the 1882 Decree was an absolute appropriation, the water court was charged with determining the 'specified
amount' of that appropriation. Absolute water rights 'are limited to an
amount sufficient for the purpose for which the appropriation was
made, even though such limitation may be less than the decreed rate
of diversion.' Thus 'the right to change a ... type, place or time of
For change puruse, is limited by the appropriation's historic use.'
poses, the lawful historic use of an absolute decree is measured over a
representative period of time for the appropriation made. When usage is decreed for irrigation purposes, the change decree is limited to
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both the express volume of water utilized and the specific acreage irrigated.
These black-letter principles of Colorado water law lead us to the
same conclusion reached by the water court: a water right decreed for
irrigation purposes cannot lawfully be enlarged beyond the amount of
water necessary to irrigate the lands for which the appropriation was
made."
"Thus, while it is true that over 80 years have passed since Mr. Jones
first began to irrigate lands beyond the 344 acres subject to the decree,
we agree with the water court's rejection of Central's laches defense.
Central could not meet the heightened burden for establishing its laches defense against the Opposers, principally because it was unable to
show that the Opposers acted deceitfully or fraudulently in waiting to
challenge Central's usage."
"In 1992, the water court decreed in a separate action that Central's ownership of 62 shares in the Jones Ditch Company (i.e., the
shares that are not at issue in this case) entitled Central to 401.4 acre
feet per year of consumptive use from the Jones Ditch. Thus Central
conceivably has been awarded 40 more acre feet per year than it is entitled to receive as a shareholder in the Jones Ditch Company, apart
from the additional 66.65 acre-feet awarded to Central by the water
court in this case.
Central persuaded the water court to avoid a ditch-wide analysis of
the Jones Ditch Water Right by asserting the doctrine of claim preclusion. Central concedes that a ditch-wide analysis would limit its share
of the Jones Ditch Water Right to approximately 361 acre feet, and
that-under such an analysis-it already has received an overdraft of consumptive use as a result of the 1992 Decree. Because a ditch-wide
analysis, in Central's view, would hopelessly conflict with the 1992 Decree, and because the time for challenging the 1992 Decree has long
since passed, Central argued below and in this appeal that claim preclusion bars a ditch-wide adjudication of the Jones Ditch Water Right
in this case.
While we understand why the water court was persuaded by Central's reasoning, we ultimately are not convinced. In our view, claim
preclusion is not implicated because the Opposers are not requesting a
reduction or any other reconsideration of the 401.4 acre feet of consumptive use awarded to Central in 1992. Without question, '[t]he
application of [claim preclusion] in appropriate circumstances is important to the stability and reliability of Colorado water rights.' For
this reason, the Opposers cannot challenge Central's award of 401.4
acre feet per year of water from the Jones Ditch, since the time for contesting the 1992 Decree has long since passed. However, the Opposers
in this case are not challenging the amount of consumptive use
awarded in the 1992 Decree, and consequently, claim preclusion is
inapplicable."
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"The salient issue raised by the applications filed below is whether
Central is entitled to any additional consumptive use credit for its remaining shares that were not adjudicated in 1992. As to this issue,
Colorado law generally teaches that Central only is entitled to water
from the Jones Ditch in proportion to its ownership of shares in the
Jones Ditch Company. Ditch-wide analyses are preferable for many
reasons, among them that they prevent expensive relitigation of consumptive use. In this case, the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion
are not proper bases for avoiding a ditch-wide analysis of the Jones
Ditch Water Right for purposes of ruling on Central's applications."
Central Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. City of Greeley, 147 P.3d 9, 14, 17-19 (Colo.
2006).

Cherokee Metropolitan District v. Harold D. Simpson, Colorado State
Engineer (No. 06SA95 November 27, 2006)
"Examining the language of the stipulated decree provision in light
of the extrinsic evidence, the water court concluded that Wells No. 1-8
may be used to supply water outside of the Designated Basin only for
emergency and backup purposes when its Sweetwater Wells are unable
to produce a sufficient supply of water to meet the commitments that
existed at the time the parties entered into this stipulation. We agree.
Any scenario that would place Wells No. 1-8 into permanent operation as a primary supply for service areas outside of the Designated
Basin would undermine the principal anti-export language and purpose of the stipulated decree provision, which dedicates those wells for
use only within the Designated Basin, except for short-term emergency
and backup situations. Cherokee's version of the agreement would
deprive the Management District of the benefit of the bargain by reversing the intended operation of the provision: anti-export would be
the short-term feature of the provision and permanent export the longterm feature as Cherokee water demand grows outside of the Designated Basin."
"Had the parties intended to maintain Cherokee's ability to utilize
Wells No. 1-8 as a primary supply outside of the Designated Basin in
the event the Sweetwater Wells did not turn out to be capable of producing the 6,285 acre feet per year of primary water supply anticipated
from them in the diligence decree, they could have said so. The circumstances surrounding the 1999 agreement demonstrate that the
parties were addressing the then-current water demands of Cherokee.
In doing so, they devised a way to allow short-term exports of water
from Wells No. 1-8 to meet those commitments should the Sweetwater
Wells experience a disruption in service.
As part of the agreement, Cherokee pledged that development of
the Sweetwater Wells to their full extent and acquisition of water from
other sources would supply Cherokee's future growth outside of the
Designated Basin. Whereas, at the time of the 1999 stipulation Cimar-
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ron Hills was the primary area served outside of the Designated Basin,
Cherokee has since added other areas of service. The addition of these
other areas has caused Cherokee to advance the position that Wells
No. 1-8 can be used for a primary supply of water outside of the Designated Basin.
The 1999 stipulation reflects no language or intent showing that
the principal anti-export feature of the agreement relating to Wells No.
1-8 would become non-operational in the event of future Cherokee
development. In reaching their 1999 agreement, Cherokee and the
Management District overcame polar opposite positions. Cherokee
argued that the Management District could place no export restrictions on any of its groundwater supply taken from the Designated Basin; the Management District contended that it had authority to do so.
Regardless of who had the better of the argument, a party may stipulate away valuable rights provided it is not in violation of public policy."
(case citations omitted).

